STATE OF MONTANA

BEFORE THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

NANCY KEENAN

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WENDOLYN J. LEONE and)
CAROL ZARN,) OSPI 175-89
Appellants) DECISION AND ORDER
vs .	<u> </u>
CRUSTEES, BIG HORN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2,))
Respondent.	j

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Leone and Zarn were non-tenured teachers in Big Horn County School District No. 2. In 1989 their contracts were terminated. The terminations were appealed to the Big Horn County Superintendent pursuant to Sections 20-4-204, 20-4-206, 20-3-324, 20-3-305, 20-3-308 and 20-3-322, MCA. A consolidated hearing of the Leone and Zarn cases was held on June 8, 1989.

County Superintendent Snively issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on July 20, 1989. She dismissed the appeal but also found the Respondent complied with the legal requirements of Section 20-4-206, MCA, and affirmed the decision of the Respondent. Leone and Zarn appealed this decision to this State Superintendent on August 17, 1989. The parties submitted briefs and oral argument was heard on January 9, 1990.

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The issues on appeal are:

- 1. Whether there is reliable, probative and substantial widence on the whole record which support the conclusions of the lounty Superintendent.
- 2. Whether the County Superintendent erred in denying syldence or argument to be presented on the issues of an adequate learing and validity of the trustees! decision.

DECISION AND ORDER

Having reviewed the complete record, this State Superintendent now makes the following decision: The County Superintendent erred in dismissing the appeals and in denying a hearing on the issues. Phis matter is remanded to the County Superintendent with instructions to conduct a proper evidentiary hearing in compliance with administrative procedure and law.

MEMORANDUM OPTNION

The standards for review by the State Superintendent are set forth in 10.6.125, ARM, which reads as follows:

- (1) The state superintendent of public instruction may use the standard of review as set forth below and shall be confined to the record.
- (2) In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the county superintendent not shown on the record, proof thereof may be taken by the state superintendent.
- (3) Upon request, the state superintendent shall hear oral arguments and receive written briefs.
- (4) The state superintendent may not substitute her judgment for that of the county superintendent as to the weight of the evidence on questions of a fact. The state superintendent may affirm the decision of the county superintendent or remand the case for further proceedings

or refuse to accept the appeal on the grounds that the state superintendent fails to retain proper jurisdiction on the matter. The state superintendent may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order are:

- (a) in violation of statutory authority of the agency;
- (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
 - (c) made upon unlawful procedure;
 - (d) affected by other error of law;
- (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record;
- (f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion;
- (g) because findings of fact upon issues essential to the decision were not made although requested.

This rule was modeled upon Section 2-4-704, MCA, and the Montana Supreme Court has interpreted the statute and the rule to mean that agency (County Superintendent) findings of fact are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review and that conclusions of law are subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Harris v Bauer, ___Mont. __, 749 P.2d 1068, 1071, 45 St.Rptr. 147, 151, (1988); City of Billings v. Billings Firefighters, 200 Mont. 421, 430, 651 P.2d 627 (1982). Further, the petitioner for review bears the burden of showing that they have been prejudiced by a clearly erroneous ruling. Terry v. Board of Regents, 220 Mont. 214, 217, 714 P.2d 151, 153 (1986) citing Carruthers v. Board of Horse Racing, __Mont. __, 700 P.2d 179, 181, 42 St. Rptr. 729 (1985). Findings are binding on the Court and not "clearly erroneous" if supported by "substantial credible evidence in the record." Id. This has been further

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larified to mean that a finding is clearly erroneous if a "review f the record leaves the court with the definite and firm onviction that a mistake has been committed." Wage Awweal v. Bd. f Personnel Appeals, ______ Mont._____, 676 P.2d 194, 198 (1984). A onclusion of law is controlling if it is neither arbitrary nor apricious, City of Billings, 651 P.2d at p. 632.

The difficulty I face in reviewing this case is that although he County Superintendent made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, a review of the record reveals that no evidence was admitted. Evidence (facts) is placed in the record y various means--sworn testimony, affidavit, stipulation of the parties. Affidavits and stipulations must be entered by the parties and admitted by the County Superintendent. The record Defore the County Superintendent consists of briefs with attachments and oral arguments of the parties, none of which is evidence. Briefs are merely persuasive argument of the parties and cannot be used by the hearing officer as evidence. Although the parties presented a consolidated stipulated findings of facts, it was not admitted into evidence by the County Superintendent. Jsing the standards of review (as set forth above) that are nandatory on this reviewing agency, I am confined to the record. Phere is a need for a more developed record. There is no "substantial credible evidence". Petitioners have carried the burden of showing that they have been prejudiced by a clearly erroneous ruling.

The County Superintendent in her Notice of Scope of Hearing lated May 23, 1989, denied Petitioner's Motion to Expand Scope of learing and refused to assume jurisdiction over issues which pasically comprise whether the decisions of the trustees were valid in that they allegedly were made without a proper quorum.

The Montana Supreme Court in <u>Canvon Creek Education</u>
Association v. Board of Trustees, Yellowstone County School
District No. 4, 47 St.Rptr. 93 (1990), citing Throssell v. Board
Of Trustees, 757 P.2d 348, 45 St. Rptr. 1228 (1988), held that
Inless a claimant's cause of action falls under the three
exceptions enumerated in <u>Throssell</u>, the administrative process
must be completed before resorting to the courts. These
exceptions are situations where state agencies have been directly
granted primary jurisdiction, where the matter is governed by a
specific statute or where the board has acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction. <u>Throssell</u>, 752 P.2d at pp. 349-50. This
line of cases gives us a very broad definition of "controversy"
as it is used in 20-3-107, MCA.

The County Superintendent is charged with hearing and deciding all matters of controversy arising in her county as a result of decisions of the trustees of a district in the county. Section 20-3-107, MCA. In order for the County Superintendent to hear and decide a matter of controversy arising as a result of a decision of the trustees of a district, the question of whether a board has authority to make a decision in the first instance must be



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inswered. All business of a board of trustees must be transacted it a properly called meeting by a quorum (majority) of the nembership. Section 20-3-322(4), MCA. In the presence of the illeged facts, Section 20-3-308, MCA, appears to be applicable, and except for (g), the provisions are self executing. This is question within the broad case and controversy jurisdictional authority of the County Superintendent.

Canvon Creek, the Court found that the County Superintendent was the proper forum to hear a question of breach of a collective bargaining agreement. In the case at hand, the County Superintendent must take evidence and determine the terms of the collective bargaining agreement applicable to termination of Leone and Zarn. It appears from the stipulated facts that there is dispute as to whether termination should proceed under Section 20-4-204 or 20-4-206, MCA. Only after a proper evidentiary hearing can she examine the fscts of the termination and conclude as a matter of law whether the trustees acted in compliance with statute as interpreted by the Montana Supreme Court in Birrer v. Trustees, Wheatland County School District No. 15, 47 St. Rptr. 247 (1990), Harris v. Trustees, Cascade County Schools Districts No. 6 and F, 47 St. Rptr. 260 (1990), and this State Superintendent in Whalon v. Trustees, Roosevelt County School District No. 64, OSPI 173-89, decided March 23, 1990.

In summary, the County Superintendent upon remand must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the following:

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Whether there was a duly constituted quorum and properly convened board meeting; and if so,

What procedure was mandated by law and/or contract to be followed for the termination of the Leone and Zarn; and

Whether proper procedure was followed.

DATED this /2 day of April, 1990.

Nancy Keenan Nancy Keenan State Superintendent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the $-/2^{\frac{1}{2}}$ day of April, 1990, a :rue and exact copy of the foregoing <u>DECISION and ORDER</u> was nailed, postage prepaid, to:

Carey E. Matovich MATOVICH, ADDY & KELLER, P.C. 313 Hart-Albin Building Billings, MT 59101

Jock B. West WEST & CASPER, P.C. Suite 210; First Citizens Bank Building 2812 First Avenue North Billings, MT 59101

Roberta Snively Big Horn County Superintendent Big Horn County Courthouse Drawer H Hardin, MT 59034

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Office of Public Instruction

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